This paper deals with the problems of assessing the effects of fiscal policy in the European Monetary Union. Here, we face wide cross-country differences in key fiscal parameters, some of which may also be vary over time (business cycle). Moreover, these effects may also depend on trade spillover effects and thus on the extent of policy coordination. Our empirical analyses make use of data for 15 EU countries, mainly for the period 1970-2011. The results clearly indicate that fiscal multipliers are not constant across countries and time, being much larger during economic recessions. By contrast, the policy coordination-effects appear to be more homogenous, although it turns out that small countries may benefit more from coordination.
Introduction
Fiscal policy in the EU faces a number of challenges. In the first place there are longer run pressures due to ageing and to the competition from countries such as China with low wage rates and managed exchange rates. Second, it is the characteristic of economic cycles in the EU that downturns are more effective in shaking out labor than upturns of the same size are in (re)employing it. Finally, the recent financial crisis has shown the vulnerability of the fiscal position of several EU countries due to problems of banking crisis, loss of competitiveness in the foreign trade, and an inability to control public expenditures and revenues. Even such issues as the "grey" economy have proves to be of great practical importance.
Clearly, we need up-to-date estimates of the effectiveness of fiscal policy in different countries and in particular data on possible asymmetries in the key policy parameters.
As for the size of the multipliers, we have several estimates which at least point roughly to the same direction; cf. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) , Romer and Romer (2010) Coenen et al (2010) , Barro and Redlick (2011) and finally Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) . Of these, Romer and Romer (2010) and Giavazzi and Pagano represent the two extremes whereas the others come close to one in the short run and converge to zero in the long run. It is more difficult to say whether the multipliers are time-invariant (or more generally invariant in terms of other characteristics of the country, say in terms of the exchange rate arrangement, openness of the country, composition of tax and spending changes and so on). As for time invariance, the basic question is, whether the fiscal multipliers are the same in booms and recessions. We already have quite fair amount of evidence that the multipliers are not constant; cf. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) for striking differences between boom and bust values. and Corsetti (2012) provide ample evidence of violations of invariance, especially in terms of exchange rate arrangements, level of debt and financial crises. It is also evident that the composition of taxes and spending can make a big difference (Alesina and Perotti (1997) as can the manner in which the fiscal actions are carried out (gradual or one-for-all changes in relevant policy parameters; cf. IMF (2010) and Broadbent and Daly (2010) ).
Another issue that remains largely unexplored concerns policy coordination: how much of a difference does it make if certain types of policies are pursued in several countries instead in a single country? Of course we know something of the consequences of policy coordination (see e.g. Branson et al (1990) , Ganzoneri and Minford (1988) , Kehoe (1987 Kehoe ( /1988 , Oudiz and Sachs (1984) and Rogoff (1985) for some key references), but we know little of the empirical facts. This is mainly due to the difficulty of evaluating the benefits from coordination. We would really need a multi-country model to obtain the relevant estimates. Unfortunately, we have relatively few models that can be used for this purpose. In this study we tackle this problem by using (in addition to a multi-country structural model) a set of reduced form models that include cross-country dependencies. Thus far, the EU has not attempted fiscal coordination in the strict sense -there are no directives telling the member states how fiscal policy is to be set as part of some annual 'plan' -albeit we do have what the European Commission (2002) describes as 'weak co-ordination' via the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG). There are also rules on budgetary balances laid out in the SGP (described by the European Commission (2002) as 'strong co-ordination'). The BEPG has no legal force and relies on peer pressure for the achievement of budgetary balance. In contrast, the SGP has in principle some coercive powers but in fact no penalties have been imposed despite a deluge of breaches, and the whole pact has become a dead letter. The new 2011 treaty (European Union (2011) ) on stability, coordination and governance promulgates a definite change in the degree of coordination and creates the potential for a full convergence of fiscal policies. This treaty may also signal a convergence to a fiscal union in which government debt would be common to the union and some taxes could be federalized. Here, we do not consider these presumably remote possibilities but concentrate instead on more technical findings on effects of coordinated fiscal policy effects.
All in all, the contribution of the paper is in the joint analysis of asymmetries in fiscal multipliers and policy coordination. Thus, we want to extend the single-country analysis towards an open-economy setting. In addition to these issues, also the nature of cross-country differences (small vs. large countries) is scrutinized in the paper. In the empirical analysis, we use data even up to 2012 and thus we can control the effects of the recent financial and debt crisis.
The structure of paper is straightforward. In section 2, we scrutinize the simple VAR model estimation results, mainly to quantify the cross-country differences and possible cyclical asymmetries (2.1), then make use of the multi-country model of the National Institute called NiGEM to examine the dependence of multipliers on country size and coordination (2.2) , after which we use the IMF (2010) model to compare different consolidation strategies and also to scrutinize the asymmetry and coordination effects within this model (2. 3). Finally we use the simple structural equations (reaction functions) for different fiscal variables to test for the asymmetry (invariance) property. Some concluding remarks follow in section 3.
2 Analysis of asymmetry and coordination effects
VAR results
In analyzing the nature of asymmetry and coordination effects we used a set of slightly differing models to ensure that the results are reasonably robust in terms of model specification. As pointed out above, first we use relatively simple threevariable VAR models. Then we turn to the NiGEM multi-country model to the estimate the multipliers and scrutinize the effects of policy coordination. As an alternative to NiGEM we employ the recent IMF model (IMF (2010) which is also used in Goldman Sachs (2011) with the data from Devries et al (2011) . To examine the asymmetry issue, we also estimate a set simple nonlinear (threshold) models for main fiscal variable from the data set of EU countries (using the same approach as in Mayes and Viren (2011) ).
For starters, we specify and estimate a simple VAR model that has been used e.g. in Viren (2000) . Our aim is not so much to get new multiplier estimates but rather to get an idea of the nature and magnitude of cross-country differences in fiscal policy transmission mechanisms. For this purpose, we estimated a three-variable VAR with output growth, the real interest rate and the deficit-GDP ratio. Impulse responses were computed by the Cholesky decomposition (using variables the above ordering). The average IRF values for 10 periods are presented in Figure 1 (estimates are based on annual data from EU15 countries for the period 1971-2011. We also estimated the models for each single country and for the pooled cross-country data (restricting the coefficients to be equal). In the latter case, the results were virtually identical to the "average" results illustrated in Figure 1 ; to save space we do not show them here.
By and large, the IRFs make sense in indicating that fiscal contraction does indeed reduce output substantially, though the multiplier appears to be less than one. On the other hand, a one percentage point (positive) shock to GDP growth increases the surplus to GDP ratio by more than a half percentage point in the short run. It is interesting to compare the IRFs over countries, especially because they appear to differ hugely for certain variables. This is especially true for the effect of government surplus/deficit on GDP growth. The average value of the correlation coefficients is practically nil (0.011). A slightly higher values are obtained for the correlations for real interest rate effects on output growth (0.145) and real interest rate effects on government deficit (0.269) but only for the impulse responses of government deficit to output growth do we see reasonable similarity (the average value of IRF correlations is 0.779).
Clearly, the results tell us that the fiscal policy transmission mechanisms do indeed differ widely as they reflect deeper differences in fiscal institutions, fiscal rules and structure of the economy. Again this fact emerges in the end of section 2.4 ( Figure 9 ).
As for the sizes of the fiscal multipliers, they appear to be relatively small and timevariant. In this respect they are quite similar to those in Corsetti et al (2012) who in summarizing their evidence point out "Output multipliers are virtually zero in our baseline" (p. 533). Indeed, when we estimate the value from the panel data representation for ∆y > 0, the maximum value of the cumulative response multiplier is only 0.11. But for the scrutinize the negative values of output growth, ∆y < 0, the corresponding maximum value of the multiplier is actually 1.18, which is obviously close to the "standard" value.
NiGEM simulations
To assess the importance of policy coordination for policy effectiveness we used the NiGEM multi-country model to compare the effects of different fiscal policy actions in the single country setting and in the case of collective policy action.
1 In the simulations public consumption was first increased in all EU countries in an uncoordinated way (country-by-country).
In all cases the coordinated fiscal expansion produces almost twice as large increase in output as does an uncoordinated fiscal expansion in the form of an increased volume of government consumption (see Figure 2 ). As expected we find that, with uncoordinated policy actions, small countries are not able to achieve much (mainly because of import leakage).
The multiplier values for an uncoordinated fiscal policy effects in small countries are generally only about 0.5. For large countries, the values exceed unity but only slightly. The average value for all countries is 0.72 (with four lags) and 0.63 (with eight lags), and the average maximum value is 0.85. With coordinated policies, there is not much difference between small and large countries; the average multiplier value is 1.25 (with four lags) and 1.17 (with eight lags), and the average maximum value is 1.46. This represents an improvement for all countries, but especially for the smaller ones. The multiplier values (in the coordination case) are in fact quite close to the values obtained by Cohen and Follette (1999) with the US FRB/US macroeconomic model. 2 By and large they agree with the more recent DSGE model predictions (see Coenen et al (2010) and Freeman et al (2009) as well as for fixed and flexible exchange rate countries). The multiplier values in the uncoordinated case are, of course very low (suggesting that the marginal propensity to spend out of income is very low and the income elasticity of imports is very high), but even for coordinated fiscal policies the multipliers are not particularly high, although they clearly indicate fiscal policies effectiveness. Note also that for coordinated policies the output effect diminishes more rapidly than for coordinated policies.
The effect of an increase in public consumption on government deficits is almost equally clear. Deficits increase, but because output also increases the effect on the deficit-GDP ratio differs from the pure deficit effect. The values for various countries are surprisingly different, reflecting the differences in output effects. In other respects, it is difficult to know why the country results differ so much (the country size and the public sector size do not seem to explain the magnitudes of the output and deficit effects).
As noted earlier, gains from coordination seem to be much larger for small countries ( Figure 4 ) whereas large countries may manage well without coordination because of their higher multiplier values (Figure 3 ). This accords of course well with the text-book analysis of fiscal policy (the same result is obtained by Ilzetzki et al (2009) ). This country-size relationship obviously creates different incentives for small and large countries vis-à-vis policy cooperation and has interesting political economy implications for fiscal policy.
So far, we have considered only public consumption but the picture for direct taxes is very similar (see Figure 5 for Finland, used here as an example although it is not perfectly representative). Coordination makes great difference in output effects but the results are less clear for the deficit-GDP ratio. The problem is with the output effects. When taxes are increased, output and income decrease, which eliminates part of tax revenues and -ceteris paribus -increases the deficit-GDP ratio because of lower output. If taxes were increased (by one per cent) in all EMU countries at the same time, Finland's GDP would fall by almost a half per cent, which would lead to a smaller surplus-GDP ratio.
When dealing with fiscal policy simulation, an obvious question is what happens to interest rates. The answer provided by the NiGEM model is 'not very much'. Thus, imposing the inflation targeting assumption for monetary policy produces only a five basis-point increase in long rates, with of coordinated policies. In the case of uncoordinated policies, the result is virtually nil. This latter result obviously contrasts sharply with all the theory on credibility and peso effects (but not necessarily with empirical evidence; see e.g. Alesina et al. (1992) ). The problem is that (with all models) it is difficult to account for direct expectations and portfolio effects. This weakness may also be crucial with regard to the assessment of policy coordination effects within the EU.
The implication of these results is interesting. On the one hand they show that it is the small countries that have most to gain from policy coordination. However, one can reverse the argument and say that the other countries have the least to lose if it is small countries do not achieve a high level of coordination. Historically, coordination among the EU countries has been fairly weak except for the countries that track the Deutschemark. There will therefore have to be a considerable change in behavior if this is to occur in future. The (old and new) SGP may have only a limited effect here since limiting the size of deficits is only part of the problem. Indeed it is only when fiscal policy is not coordinated that this is likely to be a problem, as such anomalies occur mainly when small countries experience asymmetric shocks.
Results with the IMF model
Now, we turn to the IMF (2010) model, which is basically a simple reduced form equation where the dependent variable is output growth and the right-hand-side variables consist of fixed country and time effects as well lagged output growth and fiscal consolidation indicators constructed separately for tax-based consolidation programs, spending-cuts-based programs and combined consolidation programs. All of these are expressed in terms of GDP. One might argue that these data are more reliable than the conventional measures, based on the cyclically-adjusted primary balance.
3 This model has been estimated by several authors and institutes (e.g. 
where y denotes log GDP, and Fiscal the size of fiscal consolidation -either in the form of taxes, spending cuts, or in total -all in terms of GDP. The set of equations is estimated in a panel data setting with a fixed effects specification. In the reported versions all country coefficients are set equal.
This set of equation was also re-estimated in our study with the most recent data set, 1970-2011, and the corresponding impulse responses are illustrated in Figure 6 . As pointed out in the introduction, the most controversial result clearly comes from this set of impulse response functions: taxes hurt much more than spending cuts. Obviously, there are several reasons for this striking result, ranging from monetary policy effects to labor markets, importance of foreign trade and so on (cf. Alessina et al. (2012)). Here we are not, however, interested in challenging the basic results but in extending the testing equation to the open-economy setting in which several countries pursue (in a coordinated manner) similar fiscal policies and, further on, where the cyclical asymmetries are allowed to affect the estimates.
Equation (1) as such does not allow us to analyze the effects of policy coordination because the use of fixed effects makes foreign output exogenous. The nature of this effect comes clear when we compare the estimated fixed time effects with the World GDP represented by the combined sum of sample country GDP's; see Figure 7 . Quite clearly, the fixed time effects correspond to the (omitted) World GDP! Of course, World GDP is not exogenous but equals the sample countries' GDP, so that we can respecify the basic model (1) as equation (2) 
where the b i 's are country weights. The estimation results for equations (1) and (2) are reported in Table 1 . A comparison of tax and spending simulations (impulse response functions) is shown in Figure 8 .
The qualitative nature of results in terms of different consolidation strategies remains the same as with the simple fixed effects model, although the numerical values are somewhat different (at least compared to the non-coordination case; cf. Figure 6 ). But the interesting feature in these results is the outcome for policy coordination. Quite clearly, policy coordination pays off; the long-run impact of consolidation is slightly more than two times bigger for coordinated policies -both with tax or spending-cut policies. In this respect, the results are quite similar to the NiGEM model results.
Threshold models
What about asymmetry with the IMF model? We tried to get an answer by using a simple threshold model structure that entitled two regimes for the fiscal consolidation effort, depending on whether GDP is increasing or decreasing (columns 7 and 8 in Table 2 ). The result of the test is strikingly clear. In "normal times" consolidation hurts very little whereas in economic depression the costs are very high. In fact, the coefficients of the linear "Fiscal" terms are not even statistically significant, which also reflects the fact that in "good times" fiscal consolidation may not become overwhelmingly costly. Although the empirical evidence on asymmetry is not very compelling, here it nevertheless points in the same direction as the results of previous analyses and other analyses in this paper.
In our final attempt to measure the cyclical sensitiveness of fiscal policy parameters we estimate fairly simple deficit reaction equations from cross-country data. Here we deal with the following common specification for a set of fiscal variables (deficits, expenditures and revenues):
where def refers to the general government balance metric (positive values for surpluses and negative for deficits), D refers to ratio of general government debt to real GDP, y, and r the real interest rate (government bond yield minus inflation); u is an error term. Equation (1) Table 2 , which presents a comparison of. linear and nonlinear models both terms of deficits and other fiscal variables (revenues and expenditures). The equations are estimated by OLS or GLS (Generalized Least squares to account for cross-country differences in error variances), with Nonlinear Least Squares (to account for the threshold in terms of output growth) and GMM (Generalized Method Moment to account for the dynamic panel effects).
We use both the conventional deficit-GDP ratio and the ratio of cyclically adjusted deficit (and other fiscal variables) to trend GDP, ŷ. The cyclically adjusted deficit gives an idea of the overall stance of fiscal policy, although it is difficult to specify the appropriate cyclical adjustment. It can be computed after the event but the policy stance is a forward looking concept that depends on a forecast of what the trend is likely to be over the medium term -something that often turn out to be wide of the mark. Even so, we use a well-established definition rather than entering the debate, especially since it is this definition that is used in the official EU discussions about the stance of policy (more precisely, the change in cyclically adjusted primary deficit relative to trend (or potential) GDP, which is used as an indicator of fiscal consolidation). Similarly, while interest payments are a function of the overall stance, they too vary over the course of the cycle, with the fluctuations in interest rates and outstanding debt. The main implications of the results can be summarized as follows. Fiscal policy seems to respond strongly to business cycles. Thus, the deficit elasticities with respect to output growth appear to be around 0.3 -0.6 for a one-year horizon (more than that obtained by e.g. Melitz (1997) ). But what is perhaps more important, there appears to be strong evidence of asymmetric cyclical behavior in government deficits. The effects of output on deficits seem to differ depending on the business cycle phase: they appear to be much stronger in contractions (falling output) than in expansions.
The hypothesis of equal coefficients over the business cycle phases can be rejected. 4 The rejection is also clearly revealed in Figure 9 , which illustrates the country-specific nonlinear coefficients of the output variable for deficit, expenditures and revenues (the figure is based on single-country estimates of equations (3)). The cross-country differences are indeed large which may also explain why some of the key parameters in (3) cannot be estimated with high precision.
This combination of asymmetry and large cross-country differences pose serious challenges for common policy, as well as for policy coordination. Policy cannot be based solely on mean values of the cross-country data; and the whole distribution of country values must to be taken into account. Needless to say, this makes all coordination efforts very difficult because simple rules are no longer very useful (for more details, see Mayes and Viren 2011) The different cyclical effects show up in both revenues and expenditures. Revenues seem to behave quite asymmetrically in contractions and expansions. Thus, when output increases, revenues increase less than trend output, whereas in recessions revenues decrease markedly more than does the output trend. This may partly reflect pro-cyclical tax policy -taxes are lowered in good times in response to higher tax income. With expenditures, there is no clear pattern of cyclical behavior except that the changes seem to be smaller than the changes in GDP. The direct effect of interest rates on deficits can be clearly discerned. The effect is particularly strong for net lending, but it also shows up in the primary deficits. The net lending effect obviously follows from the direct interest expense effect, whereas the primary deficit effect presumably reflects the need for an offsetting increase in revenues. More interestingly, the effect of government debt also turns out to be both significant and 'correct' in sign and magnitude. Larger debt leads to some correction in the form of lower deficits.
We do however have to be cautious in interpreting these results, as the reverse impact of the fiscal balance on output has not been taken into account in the estimation on the grounds that it occurs with a lag (while the effect of growth on the deficit is contemporaneous). Omission of expectations effects raises another caveat.
Concluding remarks 3
Country differences, asymmetry of key policy parameters and size of possible policy coordination effects pose some clear challenges for fiscal policy. The problems may be particularly important in the presence of downward pressures of the economy. Policy needs to be asymmetric itself in order to counteract the slide. Put simply, downside threats require much stronger policy reactions.
Policy coordination may pose smaller problems, but still small and large countries are still clearly in different positions in terms of common policies. Regarding fiscal policies, large countries have always an advantage because of larger multipliers while small countries may achieve such values only with coordinated policies. This does not of course mean that policy coordination would simply be a matter of country size: clearly other country characteristics and political economy issues also matter. .509 (7.83) .479 (7.57) .487 (7.81) .558 (7.53) .498 (7.81) .482 (7.62) .475 (7.50) .465 (7. A u s t r i a B e l g i u m F i n l a n d F r a n c e G e r m a n y I r e l a n d I t a ly N e t h e r l a n d s P o r t u g a l S p a i n 
